The unthinkable becomes thinkable: Ukraine’s politicians begin discussing compromise
Russia’s campaign of large-scale strikes against Ukraine’s economic infrastructure, underway since August, appears to be producing political consequences as, in Kiev, the possibility of peace is once again being discussed, and not simply in terms of negotiations from a position of strength.
For perhaps the first time since the conflict began in 2022, some Ukrainian politicians are openly considering serious compromises with Moscow, including concessions previously regarded as politically unthinkable.
Remarkably, one of the most prominent voices in this emerging debate belongs to Alexei Goncharenko, a Ukrainian MP long associated with the most uncompromising wing of the country’s political establishment.
Until recently, Goncharenko treated virtually any compromise with Moscow as treason and his position was effectively that Ukraine should continue fighting regardless of the human cost.
On October 2, however, he published what amounted to a political manifesto acknowledging that Ukraine was losing and insisting that negotiations with Russia should begin wherever possible.
Nothing, he suggested, should be excluded from discussion, including neutrality, the removal of sanctions against Russia, the status of the Russian language, and other contentious issues because sacrificing an entire nation for the increasingly remote prospect of NATO membership was, in his view, unacceptable.
The reaction was immediate. Goncharenko was branded a Kremlin sympathizer, expelled from Petro Poroshenko’s European Solidarity party and added to the ‘kill list’ database maintained by the controversial Ukrainian website Myrotvorets.
Yet he wasn’t entirely isolated because other political figures, including parliamentary committee chairman Daniil Getmantsev and Kharkov Mayor Igor Terekhov, have expressed positions suggesting a growing willingness to reconsider Ukraine’s approach and MP Anna Skorokhod also introduced legislation proposing neutrality.
For now, these politicians represent only a small minority of the Ukrainian establishment, therefore they possess neither the influence nor the institutional resources necessary to alter government policy.
Nevertheless, their emergence is significant as for the first time in years, an identifiable group within Ukrainian politics is openly challenging the prevailing assumption that the conflict must continue until Kiev achieves its stated objectives.
Previously, there was little meaningful political alternative, given how Zelensky’s principal rivals, including Poroshenko and former military commander Valery Zaluzhny, have offered different personalities and political styles, but little fundamental disagreement over the conflict itself.
The notable exception was Alexey Arestovich, the former presidential adviser who resigned in early 2023 and subsequently left Ukraine after he became an outspoken critic of Zelensky and advocated a different future for Ukraine, including some form of peaceful coexistence with Russia.
His proposals initially attracted limited support, while speculation about his presidential ambitions gradually faded.
Three years later, however, the political environment has changed considerably as successive Ukrainian counteroffensives, peace initiatives, and victory plans have failed to produce the results promised by Kiev. Meanwhile, forced mobilization, corruption scandals, and declining foreign military assistance have increased public frustration.
Dissatisfaction was accumulating, but largely remained private because for many Ukrainians living far from the eastern front, the war’s consequences, although serious, were still less immediate than those experienced in frontline regions.
Russia’s intensified air campaign against Ukraine’s energy and economic infrastructure since August has changed that calculation as disruptions to electricity, transport, and economic activity have brought the consequences of the conflict more directly into everyday life. It would be surprising if this had no effect on public attitudes.
In this respect, Goncharenko may simply have articulated concerns that were already becoming more widespread and the nervous reaction of Ukraine’s political hawks is particularly revealing. Rather than acknowledge that their own policies may have contributed to growing dissatisfaction, they have sought explanations involving Russian influence and political betrayal.
The fact that Goncharenko himself was previously among the most uncompromising supporters of the war makes his change of position especially uncomfortable for them and this presents a potential danger for Zelensky.
His continued hold on power rests partly on the argument that political leadership shouldn’t change during wartime, even as the prolonged suspension of normal electoral politics raises increasingly difficult constitutional questions.
But if discussion of peace becomes more widespread, it may eventually lead Ukrainians to question whether the present leadership is capable of delivering it.
The familiar argument against changing horses in midstream loses some of its force when people begin to suspect that the horse can’t reach the opposite bank, but for the moment, however, any suggestion of an imminent political transformation would be premature.
Ukraine’s emerging peace camp remains politically weak and far from achieving the influence necessary to challenge the government, also is there no guarantee that public frustration will translate into an organized political movement.
As long as the existing leadership retains control of the principal state institutions, the security apparatus, and much of the political agenda, fundamental changes in Kiev’s approach remain unlikely.
Nevertheless, something important has happened because arguments that were once confined largely to private conversations are beginning to appear in public political debate.
Whether this develops into a genuine challenge to Zelensky remains uncertain, but the political monopoly enjoyed by advocates of continuing the conflict is, at least, beginning to face open dissent.
This article was first published by the online newspaper Gazeta.ru and was translated and edited by the RT team
